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Mengetahui Akar Penyebab Krisis Keuangan Global dan Solusinya Menurut Sistem Ekonomi Islam



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5 tanggapan untuk “Mengetahui Akar Penyebab Krisis Keuangan Global dan Solusinya Menurut Sistem Ekonomi Islam

  1. A Solution?
    Published 10/11/08 Paul Craig Roberts, former Secretary of the U.S. Treasury
    E-mail – editor@economyincisis.org

    Editor’s Note: The following article was contributed by Paul Craig Roberts and may not reflect the views or opinions of EconomyInCrisis.org. Feedback is welcome.

    Readers have been pressing for a solution to the financial crisis. But first it is necessary to understand the problem. Here is the problem as I see it. If my diagnosis is correct, the solution below might be appropriate.

    Let’s begin with the fact that the financial crisis is more or less worldwide. The mechanism that spread the American-made financial crisis abroad was the massive U.S. trade deficit. Every year the countries with which the U.S. has trade deficits end up in the aggregate with hundreds of billions of dollars.

    Countries don’t put these dollars in a mattress. They invest them. They buy up U.S. companies, real estate, and toll roads. They also purchase U.S. financial assets. They finance the U.S. government budget deficit by purchasing Treasury bonds and bills. They help to finance the U.S. mortgage market by purchasing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds. They buy financial instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives, from U.S. investment banks, and that is how the U.S. financial crisis was spread abroad. If the U.S. current account was close to balance, the contagion would have lacked a mechanism by which to spread.

    One reason the U.S. trade deficit is so large is the practice of U.S. corporations offshoring their production of goods and services for U.S. markets. When these products are brought into the U.S. to be sold, they count as imports.

    Thus, economists were wrong to see the trade deficit as a non-problem and to regard offshoring as a plus for the U.S. economy.

    The fact that much of the financial world is polluted with U.S. toxic financial instruments could affect the ability of the U.S. Treasury to borrow the money to finance the bailout of the financial institutions. Foreign central banks might need their reserves to bail out their own financial systems. As the U.S. savings rate is approximately zero, the only alternative to foreign borrowing is the printing of money.

    Financial deregulation was an important factor in the development of the crisis. The most reckless deregulation occurred in 1999, 2000, and 2004. See Roberts.

    Lax mortgage lending policies grew out of pressures placed on mortgage lenders during the 1990s by the US Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies to race-norm their mortgage lending and to provide below-market loans to preferred minorities. Subprime mortgages became a potential systemic threat when issuers ceased to bear any risk by selling the mortgages, which were then amalgamated with other mortgages and became collateral for mortgage-backed securities.

    Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan’s inexplicable low interest rate policy allowed the systemic threat to develop. Low interest rates push up housing prices by lowering monthly mortgage payments, thus increasing housing demand. Rising home prices created equity to justify 100 percent mortgages. Buyers leveraged themselves to the hilt and lacked the ability to make payments when they lost their jobs or when adjustable rates and interest escalator clauses pushed up monthly payments.

    Wall Street analysts pushed financial institutions to increase their earnings, which they did by leveraging their assets and by insuring debt instruments instead of maintaining appropriate reserves. This spread the crisis from banks to insurance companies.

    Finance chiefs around the world are dealing with the crisis by bailing out banks and by lowering interest rates. This suggests that the authorities see the problem as a solvency problem for the financial institutions and as a liquidity problem. US Treasury Secretary Paulson’s solution, for example, leaves unattended the continuing mortgage defaults and foreclosures. The fall in the US stock market predicts a serious recession, which means rising unemployment and more defaults and foreclosures.

    In place of a liquidity problem, I see an over-abundance of debt instruments relative to wealth. A fractional reserve banking system based on fiat money appears to be capable of creating debt instruments faster than an economy can create real wealth. Add in credit card debt, stocks purchased on margin, and leveraged derivatives, and debt is pyramided relative to real assets.

    Add in the mark-to-market rule, which forces troubled assets to be under-valued, thus threatening the solvency of institutions, and short-selling, which drives down the shares of trouble institutions, thereby depriving them of credit lines, and you have an outline of the many causes of the current crisis.

    If the diagnosis is correct, the solution is multifaceted.

    Instead of wasting $700 billion on a bailout of the guilty that does not address the problem, the money should be used to refinance the troubled mortgages, as was done during the Great Depression. If the mortgages were not defaulting, the income flows from the mortgage interest through to the holders of the mortgage-backed securities would be restored. Thus, the solvency problem faced by the holders of these securities would be at an end.

    The financial markets must be carefully re-regulated, not over-regulated or wrongly regulated.

    The trade deficit is more difficult to reduce as the U.S. has permitted itself to become dependent not merely on imports of foreign energy, but also on imports of foreign manufactured goods including advanced technology products. Steps can be taken to bring home the offshored production of U.S. goods for U.S. markets. This would substantially reduce the trade deficit and, thus, restore credibility to the U.S. dollar as world reserve currency. Follow-up measures would be required to insure that U.S. imports do not greatly exceed exports.

    The U.S. will have to set aside the racial privileges that federal bureaucrats pulled out of the Civil Rights Act and restore sound lending practices. It the U.S. government itself wishes to subsidize at taxpayer expense home purchases by non-qualified buyers, that is a political decision subject to electoral ratification. But the U.S. government must cease to force private lenders to breech the standards of prudence.

    The issuance of credit cards must be brought back to prudent standards, with checks on credit history, employment, and income. Balances that grow over time must be seen as a problem against which reserves must be provided, instead of a source of rising interest income to the credit card companies.

    Fractional reserve banking must be reined in by higher reserve requirements, rising over time perhaps to 100 percent. If banks were true financial intermediaries, they would not have money creating power, and the proliferation of debt relative to wealth would be reduced.

    The Great Depression lasted a decade because the authorities were unable to comprehend that the Federal Reserve had allowed the supply of money to shrink. The shrunken money supply could not employ the same number of workers at the same wages, and it could not purchase the same amount of goods and service at the same prices. Thus, prices and employment fell.

    The explanation of the Great Depression was not known until the 1960s when Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz published their Monetary History of the United States.


    Akibat terlalu rakus, terlalu konsumtif, suka memerangi bangsa lain, akhirnya berakibat defisit APBN negeri AS itu terus membengkak. Tahun 2009 yad kabarnya APBN-nya sudah mencapai $ 2.000 miliar (setara 12,5% GDP mereka) nilai defisitnya itu, yang kesemuanya mereka tutupi dengan menjual surat utang negara (SUN) ke investor asing. Ditambah defisit neraca perdagangan yang besar dengan negara lain, utamanya Asia Timur seperti China, Korsel, China dan Jepang (silahkan simak data defisit ‘neraca perdagagan AS’ ini sejak 2001 lalu), maka semakin besarlah utang bangsa AS ke asing itu.

    Cerdasnya negeri-negeri asing itu, uang dollar hasil defisit (baik defisit APBN dan neraca Perdagangan) terhadap AS yang raksasa itu, tidak mereka simpan dan di tabung di negerinya kembali. Melainkan dikembalikan ke AS dalam bentuk pembelian surat-surat utang Negara AS (obligasi atau SUN) serta meng-‘take over’ satu persatu perusahaan AS yang bagus-bagus. Devisa yang mereka bawa pulang ke negerinya, hanya secukupnya saja untuk membiayai import mereka. Itu artinya, uang dollar itu masuk kembali ke dalam sistem pasar uang AS kembali dalam jumlah yang sangat besar tentunya. Nah, disinilah awal celakanya bangsa AS ini, ketika dollar ‘hasil defisit’ ekonomi mereka masuk kembali ke negerinya karena ditanamkan investor asing tadi, bukannya mereka gunakan untuk hal-hal yang bermanfaat semisal digunakan untuk kepentingan memperkuat industri dan membiayai litbang untuk iptek industri mereka di masa depan sehingga AS akan tetap unggul terhadap negeri lain … tetapi dipakai untuk belanja barang konsumtif dan berfoya-foya serta untuk berpetualang dengan bikin perang-perang baru di negeri-negeri lain bak kisah Rambo.

    Dan rakyat AS, terutama kalangan mudanya, jatuh dalam gaya hidup hedonisme modern, maunya hanya bekerja dengan bermain-main ‘kertas-kertas’ di pasar uang dan saham saja, dimana sudah diketahui bahwa bekerja disitu hanya sedikit mengeluarkan keringat tapi gaji gede. Pekerjaan di dunia industri sudah lama mulai mereka tinggalkan, juga ipteknya sama jua, suatu hal yang selama ini justru hal itulah yang menjadikan mereka menjadi negeri superpower sebenarnya. AS kini kalah jauh dengan INDIA dalam menghasilkan jumlah insunyur setiap tahunnya. Maka seluruh barang import pun di datangkan ke AS secara besar-besaran untuk memanfaatkan uang dollar milik asing di negerinya itu, sehingga defisit neraca perdagangan mereka semakin bertambah besar lagi karena tingginya import. Sementara negeri-negeri asing, setiap tahun menikmati bunga dari obligasi Pemerintah AS plus deviden dari bisnis AS yang sudah mereka ‘take over’ kepemilikan sahamnya ( kabarnya hingga saat ini, sejak 1978 lalu sejak ramainya bisnis AS di take-over asing, warga AS harus membayar ke warga/negeri asing sekitar $2.071 miliar dollar, silahkan baca dan lihat situs yang menerangkan hal ini).

    Jadi, bailout besar-besaran Pemerintah AS terhadap sistem keuangannya saat ini, sebenarnya ‘hanya’ menolong dan menyelamatkan investor asing saja dalam sistem keuangan mereka saat ini. Makanya ada beberapa anggota DPR AS yang ‘nakal’, meminta bailout jangan dilakukan, sebab itu hanya membantu investor asing saja, bukan warga AS yang harus menebus harga bailout itu dengan pajak yang lebih mahal. Tapi warga AS juga wajar saja kalau akhirnya harus menaggung beban bailout itu, sebab akibat polah mereka yang rakus, baik dalam berkonsumsi, berutang, dan ‘menggoreng’ kertas-kertas di sistem pasar uang mereka selama ini. Pada akhirnya, itulah harga yang harus mereka bayar sekarang ini, jangan salahkan asing!

    Dan terakhir, apa pelajaran buat kita? Sama sajalah! Pelan-pelan sejak 4 tahun lalu, Negara ini bisa hidup enak karena APBN-nya banyak dibiayai oleh SUN yang umumnya dibeli investor asing. Juga, Neraca Pembayaran kita bagus, tidak defisit, itu karena masuknya modal jangka pendek yang sangat deras dengan adanya Pasar Modal BEI. Makanya, kalau mau jujur sajalah, mungkin 75% dari total kapitalisasi saham di BEI itu sebenarnya modal asing yang bermain disana. Juga cadangan devisa kita yang sekitar $ 50 miliar itu, bisa jadi yang $ 30 miliar adalah milik asing dalam bentuk modal jangka pendek untuk spekulasi di pasar uang dan pasar modal di sini. Makanya, menyelamatkan bursa memang pada akhirnya akan menyelamatkan asing jua, takut mereka ngacir. Oleh sebab itu, ada saran, nilai kapitalisasi pasar saham di Indonesia itu ‘dibatasi’ saja maksimal 25% dari nilai GDP Nasional, jangan seperti AS sekarang ini, mungkin sudah 10X lipat nilai GDPnya…


  2. good analisis…but crisis is still complicated to me,,,
    kalau ada penjelasan yang lebih detail,ringkas, dan mudah dimengerti oleh pembelajar baru dalam ekonomi internasional (spt saya,maksudnya) mohon di email-kan ajah!!!
    hatur thank you Mr. dudung


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